

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 ACDA-12 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00  
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NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 /075 W  
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FM USMISSION USBERLIN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7322  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USBERLIN 1734

FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FROM AMBASSADOR STOESSEL

E O 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV BQG UR WB  
SUBJ: EXCHANGE WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV ON PRESIDENT'S  
VISIT AND OTHER BERLIN MATTERS, INCLUDING AUTOBAHN DELAYS AND  
POLICE ON S-BAHN.

REF: (A) USBERLIN 1729; (B) USBER 1708, (C) USBER 1562, (D) 77 BONN  
19271 AND 77 USBER 2946; (E) USBER 1712

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT JULY 21 LUCHEON ABRASIMOV CONCENTRATED  
CRITICISM ON MANY ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT'S JULY 15 VISIT TO  
BERLIN, ESPECIALLY AS A DEMONSTRATION OF A BERLIN-FRG  
RELATIONSHIP CONTRARY TO THE 1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT  
(QA). HE RESPONDED TO MENTION OF THE ALLIED PROTEST OVER  
JULY 15 AUTOBAHN DELAYS WITH A WARNING TO EFFECT THAT FUTURE  
DELAYS CAN BE EXPECTED IF WEST REPEATS DEMONSTRATIVE ACTS (REF A).  
ABRASIMOV BROUGHT UP THE RECENT SOVIET PROTEST (REF B)  
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OVER INCREASED POLICE ACTIVITIES ON THE S-BAHN, WARNING  
OF GDR ACTIONS IN "OTHER PLACES" IN RETALIATION. HE DID  
NOT RAISE SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO BERLIN PARTICIPATION IN  
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND TO GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE'S  
FORTHCOMING ASSUMPTION OF THE BUNDESRAT PRESIDENCY, BOTH  
MAJOR POINTS IN HIS JUNE 27 LUNCHEON WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR  
BRUNET (REF C). ABRASIMOV PURSUED HIS INTEREST IN ADDRESSING

NON-BERLIN TOPICS AS WELL. (SEPTTEL REPORTS ON DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA.) ABRASIMOV TYPICALLY COMES ON STRONG BUT SEEMED ESPECIALLY NEGATIVE AND HARSH IN GENERAL ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS OCCASION, MORE SO THAN AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING LAST NOVEMBER (REF D). IN ADDITION TO REFLECTING GENERAL SOVIET CONCERN OVER RECENT DOWNS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, ABRASIMOV AS A PRIMARY CUSTODIAN WITH ON-THE-SPOT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOVIET BERLIN POLICY IS NOT SURPRISINGLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE EVENTS OF JULY 15. END SUMMARY.

1. BERLIN MATTERS TOOK UP SOMEWHAT MORE THAN HALF OF MY ONE AND A HALF HOURS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON JULY 21 WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV. ABRASIMOV LED INTO BERLIN TOPICS BY FIRST REVIEWING HOW US MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CIRCLES SEEM TO BE CONFRONTING THE FORCES OF PEACE (SEPTTEL. HE WONDERED IN THIS CONTEXT ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER'S JULY 15 VISIT TO WEST BERLIN. DESPITE SOVIET STATEMENTS BEFOREHAND (HE DID NOT MENTION SOVIET EMBASSY POST-VISIT PRESS STATEMENT ON JULY 17, REF E), THE PRESIDENT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO GO AHEAD WITH A DEMONSTRATION SUGGESTING A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE QA. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WEST GERMAN FLAG ON THE PRESIDENT'S CAR SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS VISITING WEST BERLIN AS A PART OF THE FRG. LOOKING AT THE

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CAPITAL OF THE GDR THROUGH BINOCULARS SEEMED LIKE CHEAP VAUDEVILLE, VERY FAR REMOVED FROM POLITICAL REALITY.

2. ABRASIMOV COMPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT, RESPONDING TO A PUT-UP QUESTION AT THE TOWN MEETING ABOUT VISITING THE GDR, SAID THAT HE WOULD VISIT THE SOVIET SECTOR NEXT TIME. ABRASIMOV REMARKED THAT THE SOVIET SECTOR HAS NOT EXISTED FOR ALMOST THIRTY YEARS AND THE PRESIDENT IS THEREFORE EITHER UNAWARE OR USING THIS TERMINOLOGY QUITE INTENTIONALLY. THE US AFTER ALL HAS AN EMBASSY IN THE "SOVIET SECTOR" WHOSE AMBASSADOR WAS APOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT.

3. ABRASIMOV CHARGED THAT BRINGING UP THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION DURING THE TOWN MEETING ENCOURAGED GERMAN NATIONALISM. GERMAN CHAUVINISM WAS AND IS A THREAT NOT ONLY TO EUROPE BUT TO THE US, HE ADDED.

4. ABRASIMOV PROTESTED THAT, DESPITE QA PROVISIONS, THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER, WHO MAY NOT FULFILL OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS IN WEST BERLIN. SUCH DEMONSTRATIVE ACTS, WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE BEFORE, CONTRADICT THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE HE

ATTACHES TO THE QA. THIS HAS LED TO SOVIET SURPRISE AND DISILLUSIONMENT OVER THE POLICY OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. ABRASIMOV STRESSED THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF SUCH ACTIONS. IF THE US CONTINUED LIKE THIS THERE WOULD BE NO GAIN, AND POSSIBLY DAMAGES. THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BUT CONSIDER THESE ACTIONS A CRUDE VIOLATION. AS BREZHNEV HAD SAID, WEST BERLIN WAS NO "WHITE SPOT" ON THE MAP OF EUROPE.

5. I RESPONDED AT LENGTH TO ABRASIMOV'S REMARKS ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT: IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE AMBASSADOR FELT THAT THE VISIT IN ANY WAY VIOLATED THE QA OR WAS INTENDED AS A DEMONSTRATIVE ACT. THE PRESIDENT HAD COME AS HAD PREVIOUS PRESIDENTS. THE US HAS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN CONFIDENTIAL

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BERLIN AND IN MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING ITS TIES AND THE VISIT SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT. AS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE, THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ANYONE HE WISHES, WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PROMINENT PERSONALITIES FROM THE FRG. WE ALSO SAW THE PRESENCE OF THESE PERSONS AS ANOTHER SIGN OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE WESTERN SECTORS AND THE FRG AND CONSISTENT WITH THE LATTER'S ROLE IN REPRESENTING THE FORMER INTERNATIONALLY.

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INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY  
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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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6. REGARDING THE TOWN MEETING, I STRESSED TO ABRASIMOV THAT THE QUESTIONS WERE NOT INSPIRED IN ANY WAY. THE PRESIDENT HAD DELIBERATELY CHOSEN A FREE EXCHANGE WITH

CITIZENS OF BERLIN. WITH RESPECT TO HIS ANSWER REGARDING VISITING THE SOVIET SECTOR, HE HAD VISITED IT ONCE (WHEN GOVERNOR) AND MADE CLEAR HIS INTEREST IN DOING SO AGAIN. THIS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE RIGHT OF FREE ACCESS TO ALL OF BERLIN THAT ALL OF THE ALLIES ENJOY. NOTHING HOSTILE AGAINST THE GDR WAS INTENDED.

7. ABRASIMOV REITERATED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT WEST BERLIN MAY DEVELOP CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN TIES WITH THE FRG, AS LONG AS THE KEY QA PHRASE IS OBSERVED--THAT WEST BERLIN IS NOT A LAND OF NOR CAN IT BE GOVERNED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THERE WAS NO QA AT THE TIME OF PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL VISITS. SPEECHES WHICH REFERS TO A "SOVIET SECTOR" AND THE PRESENCE OF FRG OFFICIALS ARE A CRUDE VIOLATION OF THE QA. ABRASIMOV SAID THE IMPRESSION HAD BEEN CONFIDENTIAL

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GIVEN THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS A GUEST AND NOT THE BOSS IN THE US SECTOR. STATING THAT ONLY THE THREE WESTERN POWERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT WEST BERLIN INTERNATIONALLY, ABRASIMOV SAID THAT IT IS CONTRARY TO THE QA FOR THE FRG TO DO SO. HE NOTED THAT, "BETWEEN US," THE WEST SEEMED NOT SATISFIED WITH WHAT IS IN THE QA.

8. IN REBUTTING THESE CONTENTIONS I STATED THAT IT HAS BEEN OUR POSITION FROM THE BEGINNING THAT BERLIN IS NOT A LAND OF THE FRG. THIS DID NOT BEGIN WITH THE QA AND ALONG WITH THE PRACTICE OF VISITS WAS PART OF THE EXISTING SITUATION RECOGNIZED IN THE QA. I THEN CITED THE DELIBERATE AND UNWARRANTED AUTOBAHN DELAYS ON JULY 15, NOTING THE ALLIED PROTEST OF THIS QA VIOLATION. THIS BROUGHT A STRONG REACTION FROM ABRASIMOV. IF THE WEST CONTINUED TO VIOLATE THE QA, HE SAID, DELAYS COULD BE EXPECTED. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, WHICH RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THIS TOPIC, ABRASIMOV STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT, WHILE THE QA PROVIDED FOR FACILITATED AND UNIMPEDED TRANSIT TRAFFIC, PROCEDURES WERE A MATTER FOR THE GDR. IT WAS UP TO THE GDR, FOR EXAMPLE, TO DECIDE WHAT SORT OF EXAMINATION OF TRAVELER'S DOCUMENTS WAS NECESSARY. ABRASIMOV POINTEDLY DEMONSTRATED HOW A PASSPORT COULD BE INSPECTED PAGE BY PAGE. A SOVIET COLLEAGUE INTERJECTED THAT IN A TIME OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER TERRORISTS, IT COULD BE APPRO-

PRIATE TO ALSO TAKE THE TIME TO CHECK PASSPORTS AGAINST  
A LIST OF WANTED PERSONS. IN RESPONSE TO MY INSISTENCE  
THAT THE JULY 15 DELAY WAS DELIBERATE AND WE FEEL IT IS A  
QA VIOLATION, ABRASIMOV ANSWERED THAT THERE WILL BE NO DELAYS  
IF THERE ARE NO WESTERN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE QA.

9. ABRASIMOV RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE SOVIET PROTEST  
(REF B) AGAINST ALLIED PERMISSION FOR WEST BERLIN POLICE  
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TO HAVE INCREASED ACCESS TO THE EASTERN-RUN URBAN  
ELEVATED RAIL SYSTEM IN THE WESTERN SECTOR IN ORDER TO  
COMBAT CRIME. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT A RIGHT  
OF THE WESTERN POWERS AND URGED STRONGLY RECONSIDERA-  
TION. THE WESTERN ALLIES MUST UNDERSTAND WHAT COULD BE  
DONE IN RESPONSE BY THE GDR IN OTHER PLACES SUCH AS THE  
AUTOBAHN AND AIR ROUTES WHICH FLY OVER GDR TERRITORY, WHICH COULD  
SHARPEN RELATIONS DESPITE THE WISHES OF THE US AND USSR. I  
STRESSED IN REPLY THAT THE INTENTION IS FIGHTING CRIME, NOT TO  
CONDUCT A CONSTANT POLICE PRESENCE, AND NOTED THAT WE WERE  
VERY CAREFUL IN FORMULATING THIS INSTRUCTION. THE TERRITORY  
IN ANY CASE DOES NOT BELONG TO THE GDR. ABRASIMOV  
INSISTED THAT THE ALLIES RETHINK THEIR DECISION.

10. COMMENT: ABRASIMOV TYPICALLY COMES ON STRONG AND  
HAS A HEAVY PERSONAL STYLE FOR WHICH SOME ALLOWANCE MUST BE  
MADE IN ASSESSING HIS STATEMENTS. AS THE ONE WITH MOST  
DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOVIET BERLINERY,  
HE IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THOSE QA-RELATED ISSUES  
WHICH INEVITABLY SURFACE AT THE TIME OF ANY HIGH-LEVEL  
WESTERN VISIT. THESE DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION WE AND  
THE SOVIETS (INCLUDING ABRASIMOV) AGREED WERE UNRECONCILABLE  
AT THE TIME THE DOCUMENT WAS NEGOTIATED. I SOUGHT TO MAKE  
USE OF A REMINDER TO ABRASIMOV OF THIS FACT TOWARDS THE END  
OF OUR DISCUSSION, NOTING IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING  
THAT THERE ARE DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE QA AND THAT  
WE ACHIEVED AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT AGREEING ON EVERYTHING. I  
NOTED THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS WORKED WELL OVERALL IN  
PRACTICE, AND THAT WE WERE PLEASED ESPECIALLY WITH COOPERATION  
AT THE PRACTICAL LEVEL IN RECENT MONTHS. AFTER ALL,  
NEITHER OF US WANT BERLIN TO BE AN ISSUE BETWEEN OUR GOVERN-  
MENTS. ABRASIMOV CITED A RUSSIAN PROVERB TO THE EFFECT THAT  
A SHOUT YIELDS AN ECHO WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE SHOUT. GEORGE

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## Message Attributes

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